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Dixon (Steven) v. State, 137 Nev. Adv. Op. 19 (May 6, 2021)1 
 
JURY SELECTION: HARMLESS ERROR REVIEW WHEN BATSON WARRANTED 
 
SUMMARY  
 During jury selection for a criminal trial, the State peremptorily struck a prospective 
alternate juror based on gender in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.  Although the district 
court errored in dismissing the prospective alternate juror, the error was harmless because no 
alternate juror participated in jury deliberations.  Therefore, the defendant’s conviction is affirmed.  
 
BACKGROUND 
 The defendant was on trial for fourth-degree arson and child abuse, neglect, or 
endangerment. The jury was selected with three prospective alternate jurors remaining.  Of these 
potential alternate jurors, two were female and one was male.  The district court allowed both sides 
to use a peremptory challenge as to these three individuals.  The State peremptorily struck the male 
prospective alternate juror, prompting a Batson challenge from the defense because the male was 
Hispanic and did not indicate an inability to be impartial.2  The State, accepting the district court’s 
permission to respond, reasoned that the male was struck to increase the chance of getting more 
females on the jury.  This explanation caused defense counsel to signal the court that the 
prosecutor’s gender-based reasoning also violated Batson.  Ruling on the challenge, the district 
court held that the State’s explanation was non-discriminatory and excused the male prospective 
alternate juror.  The jury, without an alternate juror participating in the deliberations, convicted the 
defendant of fourth-degree arson.  The defendant appealed his conviction.   
 
DISCUSSION 
 Peremptory challenges used to discriminate based on race or gender are unconstitutional 
under the Equal Protection Clause.3  When a party exercises a Batson challenge, a district court 
must use a three-step process in ruling on the challenge.4  First, the party opposing the peremptory 
challenge must make a prima facie showing of discrimination.5  Second, if the opposing party 
meets its burden, the burden shifts to the striking party to provide a non-discriminatory explanation 
for the challenge.6  Lastly, the district court determines whether the opposing party has proven that 
the potential juror was struck due to purposeful discrimination.7  This third step requires a review 
of all evidence, direct or circumstantial, before ruling on the objection.8  The district court’s 
 
1  By Kiley Harrison.  
2  Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
3  Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 406-409 (1991); J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 140-41 (1994).  
4  See Batson, 476 U.S. at 93- 98, 100; see also Libby v. State (Libby II), 115 Nev. 45, 50, 975 P.2d 833, 836 (1999) 
(applying the Batson process to a claim of gender-based discrimination). 
5  Libby II, 115 Nev. at 50, 975 P.2d at 836. 
6  Id.  
7  Id. 
8  Conner v. State, 130 Nev. 457, 465, 327 P.3d 503, 509 (2014). 
ultimate decision is given great deference on appeal and will only be reversed if clear error is 
present.9  
 In this case, the first step was mooted because the State responded to the defendant’s Batson 
challenge with an explanation for striking the juror.10  Regarding the second step, the State’s 
reasoning for peremptorily striking the juror was gender-based and therefore discriminatory.  Thus, 
the district court errored in excusing the male prospective alternate juror.  However, the 
circumstances of this case warranted harmless-error review.11  This is because the prospective 
alternate juror did not participate in jury deliberation and therefore did not impact the outcome of 
the case or interfere with the defendant’s right to be tried by a jury selected based on non-
discriminatory reasons.  Such a determination is consistent with the need to conserve judicial 
resources and limit the costs of retrial.12 
 
CONCLUSION 
 Despite the district court’s clear error in rejecting the defendant’s Batson challenge to the 
State’s gender-based peremptory challenge used against a prospective alternative juror, the error 
was harmless because no alternate participated in jury deliberation. Accordingly, the defendant’s 
conviction was affirmed.   
 
 
9  Williams v. State, 134 Nev. 687, 688, 429 P.3d 305 (2018). 
10  See id. at 690-91, 429 P.3d at 306-07. 
11  Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579 (1986). 
12  Williams, 134 Nev. at 696, 429 P.3d at 310. 
 
